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Price Desynchronization and Price Level Inertia
Abstract
If price decisions are taken neither continuously nor in perfect
synchronization, the process of adjustment of all prices to a new nominal
level will imply temporary movements in relative prices. It might then well
be that, to avoid these movements in relative prices, each price setter will
want to move his own price slowly compared to others. The result will be a
slow movement of all prices to their new nominal level, and substantial
inertia of the price level. This paper formalizes this intuitive argument
and reaches four main conclusions:
(1) Even small departures from perfect synchronization can generate
substantial price level inertia.
(2) If price decisions are desynchronized, even anticipated movements
in money will usually have an effect on economic activity. It is however
possible to find paths of money deceleration which reduce inflation at no
cost in output.
(3) Price desynchronization has implications for relative price
movements as well as for the price level. Goods early in the chain of
production have more price and profit variability than goods further down
the chain.
(4) Price inertia, if it is due to price desynchronization, may be
difficult to remove. It may well be that, given the timing decisions of
others, no agent has an incentive to change his owntimingdecision: the






It is often informally argued that given the complexity of the price
system and the inherent problems of coordination, the apparent inertia of
the price level should come as no surprise.1 A rather appealing argument
along these lines is the following:
Then a norninal disturbance requires a change in the price level, what
is required is not a change of a single price, but a change of a complex
structure of final good, intermediate good and input prices. Price decisions
for eac-h of these goods are not taken continuously. Furthermore, price
decisions across goods are unlikely to be perfectly synchronized. The process
of adjustment of all prices to a new nominal level will therefore imply
movements of relative prices along the way. If price setters do not want
large changes in relative prices, the path of adjustment of all prices may
be slow, the price level may adjust slowly.
The purpose of this paper is to formalize this argument and to see
whether and how it survives formalization. The paper focuses on three sets
of questions:
The first is whether desynchronization of individual price decisions can
generate substantial" price inertia. It is obvious that, with so many price
decisions, the price level will not adjust overnight to changes in aggregate
demand; the question is whether, if each price is set for a relatively short
period of time, say a month or two at most, desynchronization can generate
the degree of price inertia we appear to have in the United States. The
answer of the paper is that this is indeed possible.
The second set of questions addresses whether the price level ine-rtia so
generated coincides with the usual notion of inertia or "stickiness." Does2
it for example imply that decreases in money or decelerations in money growth
necessarily lead to recessions? The answer is mixed: In general, movements
in money will lead to movements in real money balances and economic activity.
There are however paths of monetary deceleration which lead to disinflation
with no output loss. These paths are reasonable and, apart from issues of
credibility, easy to implement.
The third set of questions considers the implications of desynchronization
for the relation between disturbances, the price level and the structure of
relative prices. This is of interest both in itself and because it provides
a way of differentiating this theory of price inertia from other theories and
potentially testingit.2 Desynchronization implies snake effects, i.e.
movements in factor prices slowly transmitted to intermediate and final good
prices. It also implies more variability of profits and prices for primary
inputs than for intermediate goods, for intermediate goods than for final
goods; these implications seem to be in accordance with facts.
This paper therefore suggests that desynchronization of price decisions
is capable of generating price level inertia. If price level inertia is
indeed partly due to desynchronization, the prospects for reducing it are
not good. Given the time structure of price decisions, each price setter
chooses its price optimally and frequently. Reducing inertia requires better
overall synchronization of price decisions; this may be difficult to achieve,
either by agents or by policy.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II presents the model.
Sections III and IV look at the implications for price level inertia and the
effects of monetary policy. Section V looks at the implications for relative
prices. Section VI concludes.3
1.The Model
In order to focus later on the effects of desynchronization, I start with
a eccnomy in which all price decisions are perfectly synchronized.
Ecuilibriumwith Synchronized Prices
The econcny is characterized by itstechnology, a specification of input
?1Yand of output demand.
Finaloutput is produced in n stages, each of them carried under constant
returns- to scale by competitive firms. Technology is given by n relations:
(1) y. =v•+ O i =1,••.,n.
1i—1 1
y. denotegood i so that.y0 denotes the primary input and y the final
cuzput. All variables, here and in the rest of the paper,are in logarithms.
The .areconstants which are unimportant for our purposes and will be
d:e:adinwhat follows. Production is instantaneous3 and, to avoid issues
of Thventories, all goods are perishable.
Competitive zero profit equilibrium implies that, if p. is (the log of)
?rice of good i, the following relations hold (forgetting the e.):
(2) p. =p.1
i =1,...,n =>p=p
Increasingthe number of production stages, n, keeping the sum of O.'s
constant,allows us to increase the number of price decisions, while leaving
technologyunchanged.4'5 In this economy with synchronized prices., the
nrofprice decisions is clearly irrelevant: y is alwaysequalto y
and p to p.4
The model is closed by a specification of input supply and output demand:
(3) y=$(p—p)+
(4)ym—p
Input supply is an increasing function of its real price arid of a
disturbance E.6 Output demand depends positively on tea]. money balances.7
Equilibrium is characterized by the price relations given by (2) and
equilibrium in the primary input market; the derived demand for the primary
input must equal the supply:
(5)
Combining (2) and (5) gives:
y=y= ; p="=p.==p=m-
Noney is neutral and affects only the level of all prices. Supply
disturbances increase output, decrease all nominal prices and leave relative
prices unchanged.
Price Desynchronization
I now relax the assumption that price decisions are taken every period
and are perfectly synchronized:5
All price decisions are now taken every two periods. The basic period is
presumably short and can be thought of as a month at most.8
Price decisions are not all taken at the same time. Half of them are taken
every period, in the following way: Firms at the same stage of production
take decisions at the same time for two periods. At even stages (i even)
firms take decisions at t, t+2 and so on; at odd stages (i odd) firms take
decisions at t—1, t+1 and so on. n is assumed for convenience to be even, so
that firms producing y take decisions at t, t+2, •,firmsproducing y
take decisions at t—1, t+1, ••,suppliersof the primary input take decisions
at t, t+2, •...
Firmschoosing p. at time t for periods t and t+1 face two possibly
different input prices for t and t+1. The competitive zero profit condition
used above is now replaced byan expected zero profit condition over the two
periods. This is formalized by:9
(6) pit =4 _1t1+ E(p.1 +iIt))
i =2,4, ...,n.
E( t) denotes the expectation conditional on information available at time t.
is the current input price in period t which was set in period t—1
and E(p.1 +ilt) the expected input price for period t+1. A corresponding
formula holds for i odd, at time t—1 or t+1.
As nominal prices are fixed ateach stage for two periods, they may not
clear the market in both periods and an assumption must be made about quantity
determination. I assume the outcome to be demand determined: when a firm
fixes its price for two periods, it stands ready to supply on demand. -This
is feasible as production is instantaneous and all input suppliers also supply6
on demand. Demand for the final good therefore determines the demand for
intermediate inputs and for the primary input.10
Prices in the primary input market are set in period t at the average
expected market clearing levels over periods t and t+1. For convenience, we
assume m andto move only every two periods, so that =m+iand =
Asri = thederived demand and the supply of the primary input





Tosuinniarize, all firms choose their relative price every two periods.
Their price decision depends on current and expected input prices for the
next two periods. }alf of the prices change every period.
The only deviation from the flexible price world is the presence of
desynchronization: other sources of price inertia are excluded in order to
isolate the effects of desynchronization. This excludes in particular such
elements as labor contracts with nominal wages predetermined for long periods
of time.'2 As a result, it is not clear whether the primary input should be
thought of as labor or as a raw material. If thought of as labor, its price
has probably more inertia than formalized in equation (7).
Equilibrium ith Desvnchronized Prices
Equilibrium is now characterized by equations (6) and (7). Input market
equilibrium, equation (7), gives us a first relation between p and p,
given tn and The other relation between p and follows from the et
of pricing relations given by (6). We now derive it by recursive substitution.7
Starting from i =a,equation (6) gives:
(8) pat = + E(p1 ÷1It))
For i =n—i,it gives for t—1 and t+1:
n-1 t-1 =2n-2 t-2 + E(pn2tIt_1))
rn-i t+1 =+n-2t+ E(p2 t+2'
Assuming rational expectations, taking expectations of at time t,
using iterated expectations and replacing in equation (8) gives:
={i]n2t-2+ E(p2 k_1) + n-2t+ E(p2 t+21t)1
By induction, e can express p as a function of p:
En/2 (n/2)—i
(10) pat =2'L
b. E(p21It -- i+ j)
1=1J=O
n/ 2
+ b. E(p It —+j)
j=0
n/2 (n/2)—i
+ bnj E(P0÷2It —+i + i)
i=i j=0
n n
-ith b.E — ;b El
nj . no
Ji J—l8
This formula is quite formidable but has a simple structure. Consider




This shows the first effect of desynchronization: the price level
depends. on input prices up to n periods in the past and n periods in the
future. The weights are simply the coefficients of a binomial expansion,
normalized by their sum,
When we relax the assumption of perfect foresight and allow for
uncertainty, actual values of input prices in (10') are replaced by
expectations. The price level depends then on three sets of terms. The
first double sum involves past input prices, both actual and expected; the
term in p for example includes both the actual value of p and the
ot—2i ot—2i
values of t2i expected prior to t—2i, from t —- — ito t—21—1. The second
sum involves both the actual value and past expectations of the current input
price. The third involves both past and current expectations of future input
prices. Note, and we shall return to this below, that many terms in this last
double sum are past expectations of future prices and thus are predetermined
at time t. Thus, the symmetry between the effects of the future and the past
which obtains under perfect foresight (equation (10')) does not obtain under
uncertainty and rational expectations.
A visually more explicit representation of (10) is given in Figure 1 for

















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of a line indicates for what period the expectation of p is held. The dots
on each line indicate when these expectations were formed. The numbers under
t:e dots are the relative weights, 2 b ,.Allelements strictly to the left
nJ
of the vertical line t=0are predetermined at time t.
III.Price Level Inertia and the Number of Price Decisions
A Sim?le Neasure of Inertia
Producers of the final good freely choose their own nominal price, the
price level, every two periods and would not characterize it as sluggish.
Their price decision however depends directly and indirectly on past input
prices and, in a well-defined sense, the price level is sluggish: looking at
ecuation (10), we can usefully think of the price level as the sum of
ccmponents, some of them determined in the past and thus predetermined at
tine t,someof them free to move at time t.
This suggests a simple measure of price level inertia, namely the ratio
of the number of predetermined components to the number of nonpredetermined
13
cc'ponents in (10). Prom eguation (10), this ratio, R, is given by:
-n In R=1—2
in /2j
=.5for n =2,.75 for n =10,.92 for n =100.
Thus this ratio is higher than the proportion of prices which are not
free to adjust at any given tine——one half——and is increasing with the number
of price decisions. If n is large, most of the elements which compose the
price level are predetermined.11
That, as n increases, desynchronization implies a dependence of the price
level on input prices further in the past and expected further in the future
is quite intuitive. That, as n increases, the degree of predetermination
increases is less intuitive. Figure 2 helps understand why by showing how
the price level depends on input prices, as we go down the chain of production.
Any element below the line is predetermined and thus can only depend in turn
on predetermined elements. Any element above the line is not predetermined
and may in turn depend on both predetermined and nonpredetermined elements.
nt depends on predetermined t—1and nonpredetermined E(p1 +iIt).
E(p1 +i!t) however depends itself on partly predetermined elements such
as n3 t—1 As we extend the graph to the right, more and more elements go
below the line: the ratio, R, of predetermined to nonpredeter-mined elements
increases and tends to 1 as ngets large.
This measure of price level inertia is a bit crude: it tells us how
much of the price level is predetermined and cannot change in response to
disturbances in the current period, but tells us nothing about the path of
price level adjustment thereafter. We now look at the complete path; this
requires solving the model.
The Effects of an Increase in Noney
As characterized by (10), the effect of the input price, actual or
expected, on the price level is unambiguously positive. The effect of the
price level on the input price is however ambiguous, as shown in (7). An
increase in the price level decreases real balances, aggregate demand, the
derived input demand and thus the equilibrium real input price; the net














































































































the net effect is zero and the input price does not depend on the price level.
The system is then recursive, the price level depending on the input price,
and the input price depending on money and the supply disturbance. We start
with this case; the general case will be analyzed in the next section. If
=1,replacing p from (7) in (10) gives
r,2
(11) = b.E(2.It —- i+ j)
I i=1 j=O
1 nf n/Z (n/Z)—i
+ .E(P]t_+j)+. b. E(+2lt_+i+j)
_=1 jO
with
Considera permanent unanticipated increase in money at time to. Because
of the long—run neutrality of money in this model, the long—run elasticity of
the price level with respect to money is unity. We can derive from (11)
incremental and cumulative price level elasticities over time. Denoting the
proportional increase in money by dm we get:







Tables 1 and 2 give incremental and cumulative elasticities ofp over
time for different values of ii.Theyshow a monotonic adjustment with the
rate of.adjustment increasing initially before decreasing later.
The adjustment of the price to its higher level takes exactly n periods.
The adjustment is however substantially complete before that: assuming the
period to be a month, the adjustment after a year is 99% complete if n =20,
90% complete if n =50,75% complete if n =100.Values of n of 100 may
therefore generate the amount of price inertia we observe in the United States.
Given the highly idealized nature of the model, it is difficult to decide
whether such values for n are or are not reasonable.
There is an interesting distinction between demand disturbances,m, and
supply disturbances, E. Note from equation (11) that they have an identical
dynamic effect on the price level. Demand disturbances however affect demand
and production all along the chain of production and thus are immediately
perceived by all producers. The assumption made above that the change in money
immediately known by all is therefore reasonable. Supply disturbances on the
other hand have no direct effect on demand (this results from the assumption
of demand determination). Thus, producers of y i2, ", nwill perceive
no change in their demand or imput price at time to. If their information
included only the demand they face and the input price they pay, they would
not revise expectations. In this case, the increase in the primary input
price would slowly be transmitted to the structure of prices. p would not
n





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































The Effects of Money Deceleration
Characterizing the effects of a change in the level of money is a
useful first step but the experiment lacks empirical relevance. Of more
direct relevance are the effects of money deceleration. Suppose that money
and prices are both growing at rate g per period and that this rate of
inflation is considered too high by policy makers. What are the effects on
real output of a sudden deceleration, say sudden zero growth of money?14
The effects differ, depending on whether this change is anticipated or not.
Lets first assume that the policy Is announced at time to, to take place
at time t+n: the rate of money growth remains equal to g until t+n and













The paths of money and prices are plotted in Figure 3. Real money
balances, and therefore output, Increase slowly after the announcement.
They reach their maximum value at t0+n when money growth stops. If for
example n =50and g =1%which corresponds, if the basic period is a
month, to 12% annually, real money balances are higher by 1.3% at time t+50.
They decrease thereafter and return to their normal level at t +2n. Thus
0
deflation is achieved not with a recession but with a (mild) expansion!...18
What is this due to? The announcement of a lower money growthleads
?rlce setters to slow down their rateof increase of prices before money
deceleration takes place. When zero money growth actuallytakes place, real
ncney balances are higherbut progressively return to their normal level as
prices keep increasing until t0+2n.This is a very general feature of the
"ne' models of price inertia and holds for example also inthe Taylor—Phelps
(Taylor [1980), Phelps [1979)) model of overlappinglaborcontracts.15 What
is required however is a decrease in inflationbefore the decrease in money
growth: for this to happen, the announcementof the future change in policy
must be credible. In practice, the lackof credibility is probably what
takes this result unlikely to occur. If for example agentsdo not believe
zero money growth before it is actually implemented,this deceleration leads
to a temporary loss in output. The pathof prices in this case is also
pictted in Figure 3.
IV. Price Level Inertia and the Elasticity of Input Supply
In traditional enpirical macroeconometric models, prices are approximately
arkups over wages. Wages in turn depend onlabor market conditions; of
central importance for price inertia and the effects of money onreal activity
is the elasticity of noinal wages to the unemployment rate,the slope of the
"short—run Phillips curve." These models have howeverbeen criticized for their
foralization of expectations and the critique is as follows: expectations
cf inflation should be included in the Phillips curve and,with rational
exectationS, anticipated movements in money will have noeffect on output,





















































































































































































This section shows that, if prices are desynchronized, the slope of the
"short—run Phillips curve" is, even with rational expectations, an important
deterniinant of the degree of price inertia. More precisely, it shows that
the flatter the input supply is, the slower the price level will adjust, the
larger the effect of money on real output will be.
The case n =2can be solved analytically. As S is not necessarily equal
to unity, the model is no longer recursive and is a little more difficult to
solve. To focus on the effects of demand disturbances,is put equal to zero.




Takingexpectations at time t—2, denoting E(1t—2) by a hat and defining
—1'-
+ 2mt+
(13) (1_S)pt+2 -2(1+)p+ (1_)pflt2 =
Equation(13) can be solved by factorization to give:
(14) =At2+ A(1-$)_1 iO X t+2i
-i --
with) =(1—s) (1—s )
A gives the direct dependence of nt Ofl nt—2' it is an increasing
function of 8.For S =1(the value assumed in the previous section), taking
limits appropriately, A =0and equation(14) reduces to the equation of the21
previous section. If input supply is relatively inelastic, i.e. for 8 between
0 and 1, A is negative and tends to —1 as 8 tends to zero. If input supply
is relatively elastic, i.e. for 8 greater than 1, A is positive and tends to
1 as 8 tends to infinity. Thus, the flatter input supply, the larger the
direct dependence of the price level on the past.
What we want however is not pbut the actual value of p .Consider nt nt
as in the previous section an unanticipated permanent increase in money at
time tandassume for notational convenience that the increase is from zero 0
from unity. As there are no unanticipated movements in money or prices after
to, equation (14) together with the assumed path of money implies in this case:
(15) nt±2 =nt+ (1—A) ; t>
to
Thus, given we can solve for the sequence of prices after .t. Equation
(12) and the assumptions about the path of money give us another relation
between t2 and and thus the initial condition we need:
(16) nt =((1_6')/4)(p+
nt + 81/2
Equations (15) and (16) allow us to solve for the path of prices at and
after t
0
Table 3 gives the path of prices for different values of 8.It shows in
particular that if real input prices are insensitive to market conditions, i.e.
if S is large, the price level reacts less and adjusts more slowly to changes
in money: rcey has larger and more lasting effects on output. If we think
of the input as labor, this shows the importance of the "short—run Phillips








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Extending the analysis to values of n larger than 2 presents noparticular
difficulty and the method is sketched in the appendix. Results forn10
and different values of 8 are presented in Table 3. Theconclusions are the
same as above. As the analysis is substantially simpler when 8 =1,the last
section makes this assumption; this section has shown how theresults would
be modified if the assumption were relaxed.
V.Variability of Relative Prices and Profits
Desynchronization of price decisions has implications not only for the
dynamics of the price level but for the dynamics of the structure of relative
prices. The equation giving the behavior of any nominal pricek is, if k is
even, the same equation as for p, i.e. equation (10) with n replaced by k.
The formula for k odd is slightly different but, as there areno particular
insights to be obtained from it, we shall limit our attention to prices for
which k is even.
Snake Effects
To see the effects of a permanent increase inmoney on the structure of
prices, we can return to Tables 1 and 2 in Section III: they can also be
interpreted as giving the cross section time series of prices. The first
column gives the values ofkt for values of k ranging from 2 to 500, the
second column the values ofkt+2 for the same values of k and so on.
Table 2 shows how the increase in money twists the structure ofprices.
Prices early in the chain of production move more and adjust faster,prices
further in the chain move less and adjust more slowly. If we measure profit
rates by (pt, —k—2for sector k,16 it also appears that profit rates move
more for low values of k. These results would be unchanged if we were
looking at a supply disturbance, ,insteadof a demand disturbance, m.24
Varianceof Prices and Profits
Instead of looking at effects of once—and—for—all changes in inor,we
maylook at the stochastic behavior of prices for a given process for in or E.
Assume for example that and inarewhite——keeping for convenience the assumption
that for teven,realizations ofand in are the same for tandt+1. If, as
before, we define as in. —' thebehavior of kt is, from (10):
(17) kt bk(k,2)i
"t—2ij
Thus, the standard deviations of nominal prices, real pricesand profit
rates are given by:
(bk(k/2)i)2j°
- = (2kbk, (k/2)-i -2










Usingidentities associated with the hypergeometric distribution (Feller


































= +a2is normalized to unity m26
The values of these standard deviations, for n =10and k =0,•••,10,
are reported in Table 4. The standard deviations of nominal prices, real
prices and profit rates are all decreasing in k. This ordering is again
independent of whether the economy is affected by supply or demand disturbances.
This result is fairly robust, being due to desynchronizationi rather than
to the other assumptions of the model. There are two ways to potentially
reverse it. The first is to relax the assumptions of constant returns and
no inventory. In this case faced for example with a temporary increase in
demand, a firm may decrease its price, decumulate inventory and not change
its derived demand; it would therefore not transmit the disturbance further
down the chain of production. Its price may then vary more than prices further
down the chain. The second is to allow for disturbances to the technology
itself, for example to allow the S. in equation (1) to be stochastic. In this
case sectors affected by large technological disturbances may experience more
price variability than the others.
If we think of the primary input as raw materials——there are clearly
other factors at work in the labor market——the result is in accordance with
facts. In the United States, the variance of raw materials is larger than
the variance of intermediate products, which is itself larger than the
variance of the WPI, both for periods dominated by demand disturbances and
periods dominated by supply disturbances.17
VI. Conclusions and Extensions
This paper has shown that desynchronization of individual price decisions
generates both inertia of the price level and movements in relative prices
ich ap?ear in accordance with the facts.27
It is time to return to the assumptions and face the question addressed
to other models of price inertia. Are there obvious opportunities for profit
left unused? Is every agent acting optimally? There are two crucial
assumptions in the model:
The first is that price setters choose the same nominal price for two
periods, rather than choosing different nominal prices for both periods, or
allowingthe second—period price to be contingent. We have purposefully
chosen a basic period short enough that such schemes are likely to have costs
whichoutweigh their benefits. Indexation of the second—period price on the
price level is clearly unfeasible if the basic period is short: there may well
be no reliable price level index.
The second is the structure of timing decisions. Given the timing
decisions of others, does an agent have an incentive to maintain his own
timing decision? In our model, the answer that he has an incentive to
change it: each producer has an incentive to synchronize its price
decisions with those of his supplier. This feature is however a
characteristic of the simple structure of the model and is easily removed:
if for example each producer uses two inputs, the prices of which change at
different times, he cannot achieve synchronization with both. It is easy to
construct structures of timing decisions such that no price setter has an
incentive to change his own timing given the timing of others. With such
structures, desynchronization and the implied inertia of the price level
will remain: no agent has an incentive to change his timing or behavior.
This model can be seen as an alternative to the model of overlapping
labor contracts developed by Akerlof [1969], Phelps.[1979) and Taylor {1980).
Both explanations of price inertia are however probably empirically relevant.
The comparative advantage of this model is twofold. The first is that it is28
more explicitly grounded in maximizing behavior; this allows for an easier
treatment of normative aspects of policies. The second and more important
is that it derives the complete structure of prices together with the price
level. Thus it is well adapted to analyze questions involving both nominal
and relative prices. It can for example easily be used to look at the
desirability of exchange rate indexation under various sources of disturbances,
a question analyzed by Dornbusch 1982] using the Taylor model.29
Appendix. Price Solution for Arbitrary n and B











-8÷2It (n/2) +i +
We proceed in two steps. The first is to derive the behavior of
E(pjt_n). Taking expectations in (Al) at time t—n and denoting them
with a hat:
(A2) =2(l_B)A(L)p+ 2' B1 A(L)rn




Consider the polynomial 1 —2t1(1Bl)A(L)associated with the
homogenous part of this difference equation. It is symmetric so that if
A is a root, A1 is also a root. Thus it can be factorized as:30
1 -2(1-81)A(L)=aB(L)B(L1)
where a is a scalar and B(L) =1+ b1L + + b,2 L'2 has all roots inside
the unit circle.
This implies that E(Plt_n) follows:
(A3) 2fl•1a (B(C1))1A(L)Tn
The second step is to solve for the actual value of This is easily
done for any specific path of——or process for——money. In the case of a
permanent unanticipated increase in money at time to from zero to unit, it is
derived as follows:
As there are no unanticipated movements of money or prices after t, (A3)
irnolies for t>t +n: —0
B(L)p =a(B(L))A(L)rn
The path of money considered here is such that all values of on the right
hand side are equal to unity. Thus:
B(L)p =2 a (B(1)) A(1)
(A4) B(L)p =(8B(1))1as 2 A(1) =1
For t=t+n, t+2n—2this gives a system of n/2 equations in n
unknowns, t2n2' ..., Inturn, equation (Al) gives for31
tt, ",t+n-2and given the path of money, n/2 equations in the same
unknowns. This gives a system of n equations in n unknowns. Once this
system is solved, values of p for t >t+2ncan be derived using (A4).
This is the method used to construct the second part of Table 3.32
Footnotes
1. Many arguments along this line are presented in Gordon [1981]
2. The implications of various theories for the relation between disturbances,
the price level and relative prices are presented in Fischer [1981).
3.It is sometimes argued that a source of price inertia is the length of
the production process (for example, Coutts et al. [1978)). The argument
is that if price is based on historical cost, a longer production process
will lead to longer lags in price adjustment. Although this argument
seems to have some empirical success, it appears difficult to reconcile
with rational behavior on the part of firms.
4. An alternative formalization, which would extend work by Akerlof [1969),
would postulate a large number of imperfectly substitutable final outputs
produced under monopolistic competition. An increase in the number of
price decisions would be obtained by increasing the number of products.
The problem for our purposes is that the "technology't would not remain
invariant as the number of price decisions increased. Otherwise, results
are very similar.
5. An alternative is to formalize production as iterations of an input—output
matrix. This turns out to be difficult to analyze.
6.The supply dsturbancedoes not affect the technology. It would be
easy to allow for technological disturbances as well, by letting the 0.
be stochastic in equation (1).33
7. It is well knownthatthis relation can either be seen as a velocity
equation or as a reduced form ISLM. Allowing for an interest rate
explicitly would complicate the analysis but bring few insights. The
unitary elasticity of output with respect to money balances assumption
can be easily relaxed.
8. Although we do not derive the decision about period length from an
optimization problem, this can be done by equalizing the marginal cost
of more frequent changes to the marginal benefit of more accurate relative
prices. This analysis has been pursued by Sheshinski and Weiss (for
example [1981)).
9. This voluntarily abstracts from issues of monopoly power whichmay arise
with desynchronized price setting. Condition (6) differs in two minor
ways from the correct expected zero—profit condition: it neglects the
fact that the second—period expected profit should be discounted by the
interest rate; equivalently it assumes the real interest rate to be equal
to zero. It implicitly assumes that the firm sells the same quantities
in both periods, so that the weights on profit rates in period t
—i_1t—1 and period t+1 (p.r —E(p.1+iIt)) are equal. Both
shortcuts simplify the analysis considerably and are not the source of
the main results of the paper.
10. In a more realistic model, firms would have the choice of supplying demand
out of either production or inventories. The initial effect of an increase
in aggregate demand on the derived demand for the primary input would in
general be smaller.34
11. Using the fixed—price equilibrium terminology, our model allows for
overemployment or underemployment of the primary input but not for
unemployment as the input market is always in equilibrium. If we allowed
for changes in m andevery period, the price would not necessarily clear
the market in both periods and there could be unemployment.
12. The nominal rigidity of labor contracts is of a different nature from the
rigidities considered in this paper. It is usually of much longer
duration and the assumption of demand determination is certainly more
questionable.
:3. All the expressions in this paper are computed using binomial distribution
tables (Aiken [1955)). These give F(n,r,p) =Prob(x>r)if x follows an
n—binomial with probability p. Then:
1 • 1 2 =F(n,r,i)—F(n,r-rl, -)
rJ
The usual caveat about policy invariance of the structure applies. Such
a drastic change may lead price setters to change price decisions more
often or to try to achieve better synchronization.
:.Inhis paper [1979), Phelps considers a slightly different question. The
question is whether, starting from steady inflation, there is a path of
money such that inflation disappears over time and there is no change,
positive or negative, in output. Phelps shows that there is such a path
in his model but that the path is unappealing, involving oscillations in
the rate of inflation along the way. Our model also has such a path,
-ith the sa-e napea1ing features fQr n >2.35
16. This is more precisely the profit rate of the consolidated sector
(k, k—i). We use this definition to avoid having to introduce for
odd k. The change in definition does not affect any of the conclusions.
17. This statement is based on comparisons of standard deviations of residuals
from regressions on a quadratic trend, for subsamples of 47—1 to 80—1,
for the following three series, "finished goods" producer price index
(WPISOP3000NS in the DRI U.S. price bank), "intermediate materials,
supplies and components" index (WPISOP2000NS), and 'crude materials for
further processing" index (WPISOP1000NS).36
References
Aiken, H.: "Tables of the cumulative binomial probability distribution,"
Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1955.
Akerlof, G. :"Relative wages and the rate of inflation," QJE, A.rgust 1969,
353—374.
Coutts, K., W. Godley and W. Nordhaus: "Industrial pricing in the United
Kingdom," Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1978.
Dornbusch, R.: "PPP exchange rate rules and macroeconomic stability," JPE,
forthcoming, 1982.
Feller, W.: "An introduction to probability theory and its applications,
Volume I," second edition, Wiley, New York, 1957.
Fischer, S.: "Relative shocks, relative price variability and inflation,"
BPEA2,1981, 381—442.
Gordon, R.: "Output fluctuations and gradual price adjustment," JEL, June
1981, 493—530.
Phelps, E.: "Disinflation without recession: adaptive guideposts and
monetary policy," in E. Phelps, Studies in Nacroeconomic Theory,
Academic Press, New York, 1979.
Sieshinski, E. and Y. Weiss: "Optimum pricing policy under stochastic
inflation," mimeo, October 1981.
Taylor, .3.: "Aggregate dynamics and staggered contracts," JPE, February
1980, 1—23.